Abstract. This article addresses an optimization problem using Game Theory in an advertising environment, where decisions regarding the advertising expenditure of a supply chain members must be determined. We study a cooperative (Co-op) advertising problem in a channel comprised of one manufacturer and two competing/cooperating retailers. The manufacturer leads the channel and Stackelberg game is played between the echelons. Moreover, the retailers in the downstream echelon can adopt either Collusion or Stackelberg behavior. The possibility of coordination via a two-way subsidy strategy is discussed under two scenarios in which either the participation rates are exogenously speci ed or the members endogenously decide on these rates. It is shown that the perfect coordination of the channel is obtained via a two-way subsidy strategy in the exogenous scenario. Furthermore, under the endogenous scenario, with the whole system point of view, the two-way subsidy strategy is superior to the traditional one-way strategy.
Introduction
With the lack of cooperation, supply chain participants make their decisions independently and noncooperatively. This may lead to channel ine ciency. An important issue in supply chain management is to design mechanisms that can align the individual objectives and coordinate the activities such as productiondistribution, production-inventory, pricing-advertising, etc.
There is a variety of coordination mechanisms in the literature; for example, wholesale price contract [1] , two-part tari [2] , revenue sharing [3] , quantity discount [4, 5] , sales rebate return [6] , etc. For more information, the readers may refer to Arshinder et al. [7] for a comprehensive review of supply chain coordination mechanisms.
Vertical cooperative advertising introduced by Berger [8] is a cost sharing mechanism which manufacturers o er to motivate their retailers to invest more in advertising. Advertising is divided into national and local e orts. The manufacturer's national advertising is budgeted for expanding the product's brand image. However, retailers' local e ort focuses on customers' short-term buying behavior [9] . In a traditional vertical cooperative advertising, the manufacturer shares a fraction of retailers' local advertising costs (i.e., the manufacturer's participation rate).
Cooperative advertising is one of the most e ective methods of advertising and marketing. It has been highly promoted in today's marketing practices. Companies such as Apple [10] and IBM [11] have bene ted from this program. Small online co-op advertising does exist particularly in automotive and durable goods [12] . The interested readers may refer to \Co-op Advertising Programs Sourcebook" which lists thousands of available co-op programs in 52 product classi cations. The categories range from agricultural products to toys.
Co-op advertising has been discussed in the literature, where the participation rates are exogenously given [13, 14] . However, the supply chain members may want to optimize the participation rates as discussed by Zhang et al. [15] . Optimizing the participation rates in the cooperative advertising program via endogenous setting may hurt the whole supply chain e ciency. When one of the participants in the supply chain optimizes a speci c variable, the other participants' objectives may be ignored; accordingly, the whole channels objectives may be ignored [16] . In this paper, we investigate this feature by assuming both endogenous and exogenous scenarios and investigate the e ect of each parameter setting on supply chain e ciency.
Almost all of the research articles on cooperative advertising focus on one-way subsidy contract where only the manufacturer shares the retailer's advertising costs. There are only three articles which consider bilateral participation in the cooperative advertising program [13] [14] [15] . However, their models do not consider retailers' competition in the downstream echelon of the supply chain. Although, there are some research papers in the literature on cooperative advertising in a duopoly market [17] [18] [19] [20] , however, to the best of our knowledge, the e ect of a two-way subsidy contract has not been considered yet.
The objectives of the paper are: (a) to investigate the potential bene ts of the two-way subsidy contract comparing with the traditional one-way contract; (b) to explore the di erences between endogenous parameter setting and exogenously determined parameters setting; (c) to investigate the e ect of competition between the retailers on supply chain e ciency. So, the main contributions of this research are as follows: The model compares the two-way subsidy strategy with the traditional one-way strategy to explore its potential advantages. Also, the competition e ect of retailers on the channel e ciency is examined.
We study a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two identical retailers. Participants located in echelons (i.e., the manufacturer in the upstream and two retailers in the downstream), play a Stackelberg game. Moreover, in downstream echelon of the channel, retailers obey either collusion or Stackelberg behavior. A two-way subsidy strategy for channel coordination has been discussed in the literature, where the participation rates are exogenously speci ed. In this research, we investigate the channel coordination problem in which the members can decide on the values of participation rates. In a two-way subsidy strategy, the manufacturer shares the local advertising costs and retailers share the national advertising cost. Here, two scenarios are considered in which the participation rates can be either exogenously given or endogenously determined.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie y reviews the related literature. In Section 3, the notations and assumptions of the model are described. Then, in Section 4, cooperative benchmark solution (Section 4.1) and two other scenarios, including exogenous setting (Section 4.2) and endogenous setting (Section 4.3), are introduced. For each scenario, optimal advertising decisions considering collusion and Stackelberg cases are determined. Moreover, for each case in the second scenario, both oneway and two-way subsidy contracts are considered. In Section 5, the results are compared via theoretical and numerical analysis. Finally, conclusion and managerial implications are summarized in Section 6.
Literature review
Here, we brie y review the related researches. For an excellent review on cooperative advertising program, we refer the interested readers to Aust and Buscher [9] and Jrgensen and Zaccour [21] . Among the earliest papers, in 1973, Berger analyzed cooperative advertising issue for the rst time [8] . After that, other authors extended di erent aspects of Berger's work. Some authors consider a case where there is more than one member in upstream and/or downstream of the channel and apply di erent mechanisms for channel coordination. Some consider one-manufacturer and two-retailers channel [22] [23] [24] [25] ; some study a channel with a single retailer and two competing suppliers [26] . However, the researches on competition between retailers or between suppliers are scarce.
In these studies, the e ects of various competitive behaviors on cooperative advertising policies (i.e., competition on price or advertising plans) are investigated. For example, Chutani and Sethi [27] studied a supply chain with a manufacturer and two competing retailers. They assumed that retailers play a di erential Nash game in choosing their strategies; Karray and Zaccour [28] studied a channel including two manufacturers and two retailers in which the national advertising e orts are speci ed as an exogenous parameter instead of decision variable; Zhang and Xie [29] studied a channel with multiple retailers for investigating the impact of the retailer's multiplicity on members' decision and total e ciency. In our research, one retailer's local advertising e ort has a negative impact on another retailer's sale volume. Alaei et al. [30] studied a singleManufacturer-two-retailer supply chain where retailers compete for local advertising investment. They utilized Nash bargaining model in order to determine how the channel members must split the extra pro t obtained by moving to the cooperation case.
There are a few researches in the literature that consider a two-way subsidy participation strategy, in which not only the manufacturer pays a fraction of the local advertising to retailers, but also retailers pay a part of the national advertising costs to the manufacturer. Kunter [13] considered a contract of royalty payments that can achieve the perfect coordination of the retailer-manufacturer channel. Their contract includes wholesale price, revenue sharing rate, and twoway subsidy participation rates. Zhang et al. [14] studied the impact of the reference price on decisions of members, and they applied the two-way subsidy participation where the participation rates are given. Ingene and Parry [22] considered channel coordination and examined the channel coordination by quantity discount and two-part tari in a one-manufacturer and two-retailer channel. Lee & Yang [31] used the same contracts in a one-retailer and two-competing-suppliers case. Bergen and John [32] examined the two-part tari in a channel where two retailers and two suppliers compete. Zhang et al. [15] investigated the cooperative advertising problem with one retailer and one manufacturer under the bilateral participation strategy and concluded that it is necessary for participation rates to be given in order to achieve channel coordination.
Notations and assumptions
The following notations are used throughout the paper: We consider a one-manufacturer and two-retailer channel, in which the manufacturer (M) sells the product to consumers through two retailers (r 1 and r 2 ). All rms are willing to optimize their own revenue by choosing their local/national advertising investment as well as their participation rate on another rm's advertising plan.
Assumption 2: The manufacturer' and each retailer's dollar marginal pro t per unit are 0 > 0 and > 0, respectively, with ' = 0 =.
We assume that both retailers have the same marginal pro t. Note that the pricing decisions are not considered directly in our study and we mainly focus on advertising decisions. So, the retail and wholesale prices are exogenously determined. Note that ' is the relative channel power of the manufacturer compared with each retailer.
Assumption 3: The market demand is simultaneously a ected by the members' advertising e orts.
We assume that both retailers face similar market demand. Each retailer i's local advertising (l i ) and manufacturer's national advertising (N) have a positive e ect on product sales of the retailer i. However, the rival retailer j's local advertising has a negative e ect on retailer i's sale volume due to the competitive relationship between them. So, similar to Alaei et al. [30] , we assume that the retailer i's demand function has the form S i = b( The parameter is the fraction of the local advertising investment that the manufacturer agrees to share with each of the retailers. Similarly, is the portion of the national investment paid by each retailer to the manufacturer. Without loss of generality, we assume the same local advertising allowance for both retailers. Taking Assumptions 3 and 4 into account, the retailer i's, manufacturer's, sum of the retailers', and total channel's pro t can be expressed, respectively, as follows:
M =b'
r 1 +r 2 =b
Assumption 5: (Game structure) Two scenarios including exogenous setting and endogenous setting are examined. For each scenario, two cases are investigated. The manufacturer always acts as the leader of Stackelberg game with the retailers being the followers. Moreover, the retailers can either compete (Stackelberg case) or cooperate (Collusion case). Retailers cooperate in the collusion case in order to maximize their aggregate pro t, while in the Stackelberg case, they play a Stackelberg game with the retailer 1 being the leader. For each case in the exogenous setting, we consider the conditions for perfect coordination. Also, we investigate the superiority of two-way subsidy strategy over the one-way subsidy strategy for each case in the endogenous setting.
Assumption 6: (Decision making) In the exogenous setting, the participation rates are exogenously given, and each member decides on his advertising investment. In the endogenous setting, the manufacturer optimizes participation rates; the retailer 1 decides on his local and the manufacturer's national advertising investment, while the retailer 2 only determines his local investment.
Moreover, in the endogenous setting, we examine a one-way subsidy strategy where the retailers' participation rate is assumed to be zero. So, the manufacturer only optimizes his participation rate. Note that each member cannot determine both his advertising investment and his participation rate in the endogenous setting, since this leads to trivial or unreasonable game results, as discussed in Zhang et al. [15] . For example, if one retailer is allowed to choose his local investment and his own participation rates, then his participation rate will be set to zero.
Solution approaches
In this section, we formulate the problem under the various settings. We examine the problem under two scenarios, where the participation rates can be either exogenously given or endogenously determined. The manufacturer leads the channel and Stackelberg game is played between the two echelons. For each scenario, two cases are investigated. In the rst case, the retailers aim to optimize their aggregate pro t; consequently, they follow collusion behavior, while the competition between retailers is based on Stackelberg game due to existence of a dominant retailer in the second case. We need the cooperative solution as a benchmark in order to examine the e ciency of di erent strategies.
Cooperative solution
When participation rates are either exogenously given or endogenously determined, we have the same solution for cooperative case. By solving the rst order conditions @ S =@l 1 = 0, @ S =@l 2 = 0, and @ S =@N = 0, the optimal cooperative solution is obtained as follows:
Scenario 1: Exogenous setting
Here, we consider a situation where the participation rates (; ) are exogenously given. All the members of the channel know this and play a game in which the manufacturer rst decides on national advertising cost, and then retailers choose their local advertising costs. We examine two decentralized cases and in both, the Stackelberg game is played between the two echelons with the manufacturer being the leader, and retailers choose their best responses according to the manufacturer's decision.
Collusion case (the cooperating retailers)
Here, retailers obey collusion behavior in downstream of the channel. So, the sum of their pro t function should be maximized. They decide on their local advertising investments. By solving the rst order conditions, @ r1+r2 =@l i = 0 for i = 1; 2, we get l 1 = l 2 = (0:5b(1 d)=(1 )) 2 . Then, the manufacturer takes the retailers' response into consideration and maximizes his pro t by solving @ M =@N = 0, which results in the national advertising cost to be equal to N = (b'= (1 2) 
The retailer 2's response can be obtained by solving @ r 2 =@l 2 = 0, and we get l 2 = (0:5b=(1 )) 2 . Then, the dominant retailer (retailer 1), knowing the retailer 2's response, maximizes his pro t function by @ r1 =@l 1 = 0, which leads to the same value for his local investment cost as for retailer 2. Now, substituting l 1 and l 2 into Eq. (2) and letting @ M =@N = 0, the national advertising cost is obtained as N = (b'=(1 2)) 2 .
It is obvious that both cases result in the same values for the decision variables. Now, by appropriately specifying the participation rates, bilateral strategy will lead to complete channel coordination, in which the whole channel's pro t is maximized. Proposition 1: When the participation rates are exogenously determined, the two-way subsidy strategy is capable of coordinating the channel if and only if they are speci ed as follows:
In the Collusion case:
In the Stackelberg case:
if ' > d=(1 d) :
And, if ' < d=(1 d), there is no feasible two-way subsidy strategy.
Proof: If ' < d=(1 d), the optimal value of will be equal to zero. So, we will have unilateral strategy. Now, consider that ' > d=(1 d), the channel will be coordinated if and only if cooperative solution coincides with that of Collusion and Stackelberg solutions. Comparing l i with l i and N with N, the proof will be completed.
Insight 1: It is obvious that as the degree of substitutability increases (or, in other words, retailers compete more ercely), retailers' local investment and the manufacturer's participation will be decreased. However, retailers' participation in national advertising investment only depends on '. As ' increases, the manufacturer will prefer to share more of local advertising costs, however, the retailers will tend to share less of national advertising cost.
Insight 2: The manufacturer should set his pro t margin greater than d=(1 d) in order to have a feasible two-way subsidy strategy, and consequently, to achieve channel coordination.
Insight 3: The amount of subsidy paid by the manufacturer to the retailers in the Stackelberg case is greater than that in the Collusion case, while the amount of subsidy paid by the retailers to the manufacturer is the same in both cases. The manufacturer pays an amount of T = l i to the retailer i. The value of l i is the same in both cases, while we always have Cn > stag ; so, we have T Cn > T stag . Each retailer pays an amount of T 0 = N to the manufacturer. Since and N are the same in both cases, then T 0 is the same.
Scenario 2: Endogenous setting
4.3.1. Collusion case (the cooperating retailers) Below, we discuss each of the one-way and two-way strategies:
(a) One-way subsidy strategy ( = 0). In this situation, rst, the manufacturer chooses his national advertising cost (N) as well as his participation rate ( ), then the duopolistic retailers decide on their local advertising program. So, retailers' response is equal to l 1 = l 2 = (b(1 d)=2(1 )) 2 from @ r 1 +r 2 =@l 1 = 0 and @ r 1 +r 2 =@l 2 = 0. Now, the manufacturer's problem can be rewritten as follows:
Then, by solving @ M =@N = @ M =@ = 0, the solution will be obtained as below:
(b) Two-way subsidy strategy ( 6 = 0). Under this strategy, the manufacturer leads the game and decides on both participation rates, while the retailers act as followers and choose their local advertising costs as well as the manufacturer's advertising expenditure. The retailers' response will be l 1 = l 2 = (b(1 d)=2 (1 )) 2 and N = (b=2) 2 from @ r 1 +r 2 =@l 1 = 0, @ r 1 +r 2 =@l 2 = 0 and r1+r2 =@N = 0. Then, the manufacturer's problem can be rewritten as:
Now, by solving @ M =@ = @ M =@ = 0, we get the solution as follows:
Stackelberg case (the dominant retailer)
Below we discuss each of the one-way and two-way strategies: (a) One-way subsidy strategy. In this situation, rst, the manufacturer chooses his national advertising cost (N) as well as his participation rate ( ), then the duopolistic retailers decide on their local advertising program. First, the retailer 1 chooses his advertising level, then the retailer 2 chooses l 2 . So, retailers' response is equal to l 1 = l 2 = (b=2(1 )) 2 . Now, the manufacturer's problem can be rewritten as follows: (b) Two-way subsidy strategy. Under this strategy, the manufacturer leads the game and decides on both participation rates, while retailers act as followers and choose advertising costs. In the downstream echelon, the dominant retailer decides on his local and national advertising level, while the other one only chooses his own local investment cost. Similar to the previous section, from the Stackelberg game between retailers, we have l 1 = l 2 = (b=2(1 )) 2 and N = (b) 2 =4 2 . Now, by substituting retailers' response into Eq. (2), the manufacturer's problem can be rewritten as follows:
By solving @ M =@ = @ M =@ = 0, we get the optimal values for participation rates. Substituting and into retailers' response, the solution is obtained follows: 
Computational results

Comparison between strategies and cases
In this section, we examine the performance of di erent strategies under two cases discussed above. We summarize the members' decision and pro t under di erent strategies in Tables 1 and 2 . The solution of collusion case is shown in Table 1 and the Stackelberg case is summarized in Table 2 . The second and third columns of each table pertain to one-way and two-way strategies, respectively. For both strategies of each case, the solution ( ; ; N; l i ), the members' individual pro t, and whole channel's pro t are computed. It is obvious that none of the strategies can achieve the perfect coordination of the channel. It can be proved by comparing the whole channel's pro t under cooperative case with that of each strategy. Note that in order to have a feasible solution at collusion and Stackelberg cases, we should have ' > 0:5 and ' > 1=2(1 d), respectively. It can be proved by letting the value of 
The value of corresponds to the ratio of each strategy's total pro t to that of cooperative case. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Insight 4: The e ciency of the channel under
Stackelberg case is greater than that of collusion case in both one-way and two-way subsidy strategies for d < 2=3. This result can be proved by considering the results of Table 3 . Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the channel e ciency for ' = 1 and ' = 2, respectively.
Furthermore, it can be easily proved that eciency of the two-way strategy is higher than that of the one-way strategy in both collusion and Stackelberg cases. By applying the two-way strategy rather than the one-way, the e ciency increases by 3=2(1+') 2 (2+ (1 d) 2 ) in both cases. So, we get the following insight.
Insight 5: The superiority of the two-way strategy depends neither on the values of ' and d nor on the behaviour which is obeyed by the retailers.
Illustrative example
In order to validate the model, we also present a numerical example by considering the parameter value as b = 1000, = 2, ' = 1; 2; 3, and d = 0:15; 0:3; 0:45; 0:6. The optimal values for collusion and Stackelberg cases are given in Table 4 and Table 5 , respectively. Note that the values of N, l i , r i , M , and s have been divided by 1000000 in both tables.
From Tables 4 and 5 , note that by moving from one-way to two-way strategy, and l i remain unchanged; the values of N, M , and s are increased; however, r i is decreased.
Conclusion and managerial implications
This paper investigated the cooperative advertising problem by taking the competition/cooperation e ect of retailers into account. We applied game-theoretic approach in order to formulate the behavior among the members of the supply chain. We investigated the oneway subsidy strategy where the manufacturer shares a part of retailers' local advertising investment. A situation, where retailers also share the manufacturer's national advertising investment, was considered in the two-way subsidy strategy.
It was shown that: a) When the participation rates are exogenously given, the two-way subsidy strategy is capable of coordinating the channel regardless of which behavior is obeyed between retailers; b) In the endogenous setting, assuming each member aims to maximize his own pro t, the perfect coordination will not be obtained. The e ciency of the two-way strategy is higher than that of the one-way strategy in both collusion and Stackelberg cases. By applying the two- way strategy rather than the one-way, the e ciency (ratio of each strategy's total pro t to that of the cooperative case) will be increased in both cases. Our study can be extended to a case with multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers. One can adopt a more general demand function or stochastic demand function in order to generalize our nding regarding the bene ts of exogenous setting compared to the endogenous setting and the advantages of two-way subsidy contract compared to the traditional one-way contract. Designing another contract with su cient incentives for all members of the channel will be interesting. As previously discussed, the two-way subsidy strategy under collusion and Stackelberg cases is only feasible when speci c conditions are met. Designating other contracts which make the two-way strategy always feasible is of absolute necessity.
